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RECENT DECISIONS
AGENCY-EMPLOYER HELD LIABLE IN RESPONDEAT
SUPERIOR FOR THE NEGLIGENCE OF ITS
PHYSICIAN EMPLOYEE
Applicant for employment with defendant company was
required to submit to a blood test. The physician employed by
the company damaged the nerves in the applicant's arm while
attempting to extract blood for analysis. Held (3-2): Where the
physician is not engaged in treating the employee, and the negli-
gent acts committed by the physician are solely for the benefit
of the employer's business, the employer is liable for the negli-
gence of the physician. Mrachek v. Sunshine Biscuit, Inc., 286
App. Div. 105, 126 N. Y. S. 2d 383 (1st Dep't 1953).
Where an injured employee is treated by a physician working
in an employer's medical department, the physician's acts are
those of an independent contractor. Schneider v. New York Tele-
phone Company, 249 App. Div. 400, 292 N. Y. Supp. 399 (1st
Dep't 1937), aff'd, 276 N. Y. 655, 13 N. E. 2d 47 (1938) ; Stone v.
Goodman, 241 App. Div. 290, 271 N. Y. Supp. 300 (1st Dep't 1934).
Thus, only the selection of an incompetent physician will impose
liability on the employer. Laubheim v. De Koninglyke, N. Y. Co.,
107 N. Y. 228, 13 N. E. 78 (1887).
It must be noted that only the medical acts of physicians and
nurses are capable of relieving the private corporate employer
from liability. Phillips v. Buffalo General Hospital, 239 N. Y. 788,
146 N. E. 199 (1924). Thus in all cases the test is whether the
act done was a medical act, i. e., professional in character, as dis-
tinguished from an administrative act, i. e., one not involving an
exercise of professional skill and judgment. Dillon v. Rockaway
Beach Hospital, 284 N. Y. 176, 180, 303 N. E. 2d 373, 374 (1940).
The distinction is often a close one and New York Courts have
held the following to be medical acts: the application of hot water
bottles to a patient's feet by an orderly or nurse, Sutherland v.
New York Polyclinic Medical School and Hospital, 298 N. Y. 682,
82 N. E. 2d 583 (1948); Phillips v. Buffalo General Hospital,
supra; the leaving of a patient on top of a table by an orderly who,
had he remained with the patient, would have performed the
duties of a nurse. Andrews v. The Roosevelt Hospital, 259 App.
Div. 733, 18 N. Y. S. 2d 447 (2d Dep't 1940). However, where
a nurse places hot water bottles on a bed preparatory to receiving
a patient, lacone v. New York Polyclinic Medical School and
Hospital, 269 App. Div. 955, 58 N. Y. S. 2d 244 (2d Dep't 1945)
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or fails to attach sideboard to a patient's bed, Roselli v. Society
of New York Hospital, 295 N. Y. 850, 67 N. E. 2d 257 (1946), the
act has been held to be administrative.
Some jurisdictions have applied a test that ignores the dis-
tinction between medical and administrative acts and have held
that where an employer maintains a medical department and
directs his employees to go to it for treatment, the employer is
liable for the negligence of a physician, Knox v. Ingalls Shipbuild-
ing Corp., 158 F. 2d 973 (7th Cir. 1947); or nurse, Ebert v. Emer-
son Electric Mfg. Co., 264: S. W. 453 (Mo. App. 1924).
The court in the present case stresses the fact that the appli-
cant had no choice but to submit to a physical examination and
blood test. Since she was not seeking medical attention, no
physician-patient relationship could result and hence no medical
act occurred. The requirement that a physician-patient relation-
ship is necessary before an employer can escape liability is inter-
esting in view of the fact that the New York Courts have previous-
ly stressed the nature of the act performed and not the relationship
of the parties involved. Sutherland v. New York Polyclinic
Medical School and Hospital, supra. Thus, a hospital is relieved
of liability for the medical negligence of a physician, not because
the relationship of physician and patient does not exist or because
the patient remains the patient of the physician who sends him
to the institution, but because a physician's medical acts are
always those of an independent contractor. Bakel v. University
Heights Sanitarium, 277 App. Div. 572, 101 N. Y. S. 2d 385 (1st
Dep't 1950), aff'd 302 N. Y. 870, 100 N. E. 2d 51 (1951).
The holding of the instant case was declared to be the correct
rule of law in Rannard v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 26 Cal. 2d 149,
157 P. 2d 1, (1945), where a prospective employee was injured by
the negligence of a company physician. Even though a medical
act was involved, the court held the unusual degree of the em-
ployer's self-interest necessitated the use of respondeat superior.
While the present decision imposes a new and significant
legal obligation on employers who require a physical examination
of job applicants, nothing in its rationale suggests a departure
from the general rule that company physicians who render medi-
cal aid to injured employees act as independent contractors. If
the case implies that the extraction of blood for analysis is not a
medical act, it is submitted other courts may decline to follow
such a determination.
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